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Various analyses conducted at the National Bank of 
Belgium (Cornille, 2009) (Coppens, 2010) (NBB, 2010) 
and elsewhere (ECB, 2010) (NAI Price Observatory, 2010) 
show that in recent years prices of gas (and electricity) 
have made a signifi  cant contribution to infl  ation and have 
increased the volatility measured by the harmonised index 
of consumer prices (HICP). Various reasons for this have 
been suggested, including the ways in which liberalisation 
has changed the methods of setting the prices charged to 
residential customers.
Indeed, the aim of market liberalisation is to ensure that 
activities previously organised as monopolies are opened 
up to competition. In the gas and electricity sectors, this 
has been a three-stage process  : segmentation of the 
production  /  supply chain, introduction of competition in 
the liberalised segments, and maintenance of control in 
the segments where the natural monopoly still exists. For 
the European gas industry, this has led to the decoupling 
of the liberalised activities concerning the purchase and 
sale of gas upstream and downstream of the transmis-
sion  /    distribution infrastructures, while the latter remain 
subject to regulation. In practice, this process has entailed 
thorough restructuring of the segments concerned and 
the establishment of new market mechanisms and chan-
nels linked to the unbundling of the gas supply chain. 
Consumers in Belgium have felt the effect of these 
changes, and since 1 January 2007 they have all been able 
to choose from a range of suppliers. Previously, gas was 
supplied by a vertically integrated operator at the same 
price for everyone, but nowadays Belgian consumers have 
the choice between several operators all offering their 
own tariff formulas.
This article analyses how the operators active on the 
Belgian gas market have taken advantage of this freedom 
to set prices, and how they are positioning themselves 
against what is happening in neighbouring countries. 
The analysis of the methods of setting retail prices on the 
basis of the price lists issued by the main operators shows 
that the latter have substantial freedom to set prices in 
Belgium, whereas this degree of freedom is not the same 
in other countries, a fact which must be borne in mind 
when making international price comparisons.
After a brief description of the structure of the Belgian 
wholesale and retail markets on the basis of the various 
operators active on those markets, section 2 focuses on 
an analysis per component of the variable-price tariff 
formulas offered by the gas suppliers serving customers 
in the residential sector. The situation of the operators 
as regards retail pricing is then assessed from an inter-
national perspective, and some fi  ndings which emerged 
during the exercise are also stated.
*  The author would like to thank L. Aucremanne, F. Coppens, D. Cornille, 
J.-P. Pauwels and G. van Gastel for their comments and observations on this 
article.40
1.  Liberalisation and restructuring of 
the gas and electricity supply chain
Liberalisation implied a restructuring of the gas and elec-
tricity supply chain, which involved a decoupling of the 
chain into various segments, namely production  /  supply, 
transmission, distribution and marketing  (1). It also entailed 
the establishment of pricing methods for each segment 
and between them, with :
–   production  /  supply, where pricing is not regulated  ; 
prices are based on transactions taking place on vari-
ous wholesale markets between producers, shippers 
and resellers on the basis of mutual or over-the-counter 
(OTC) contracts, transactions on exchanges or via 
  auctions (gas releases  (2)) ;
–   transmission and storage invoiced by the transmission 
network operator (TNO), either on the basis of negoti-
ated prices or on the basis of prices regulated by a regu-
latory body, which is the option adopted in Belgium ;
–    distribution invoiced in Belgium by the distribution net-
work operators (DNOs) also on the basis of regulated 
prices ;
–    and marketing to small consumers for whom prices are 
based on “free” standardised retail market tariff formu-
las, and on the basis of negotiated contracts for large 
industrial consumers (often with direct supply from the 
transmission network).
The price charged to the end-user includes the costs and 
profit margins of each segment, plus surcharges and 
taxes.
Since gas is a primary energy source which has to be 
bought from the producers, gas resellers on the wholesale 
and retail markets act as commercial agents whose tariff 
structures are designed to cover the cost of buying the 
gas, in particular. As at 31 December 2009, ten suppliers 
were active on the Belgian wholesale market out of a 
total of twenty-eight operators holding a federal licence 
to supply natural gas. This concerns supplies to customers 
(large consumers) linked directly to the TNO’s transmission 
network (Fluxys) and to resellers active on the distribution 
networks. Chart 1 shows the distribution of market shares 
on the basis of energy supplied by the various operators 
active in 2009.
On the retail market, 45  % of the gas volumes are sup-
plied via the distribution networks for residential and 
business consumers (SMEs and self-employed workers 
connected to the distribution networks). The bulk of that 
gas is supplied in the Flemish Region (67 % of the volumes 
supplied by distributors). Twelve suppliers are active on 
the retail market alongside the DNOs  (3). Only seven of 
the twelve suppliers have developed an active market-
ing policy targeting customers in the residential sector. 
Chart 2 shows their respective market shares on the basis 
of the number of access points  (4).
chArt 1  operators active on the natural gas wholesale market































(1)  For a description of the gas market and its various components, see 
Swartenbroekx C. (2007), The gas chain : influence of its specificities on the 
liberalisation process, NBB, Working Paper 122.
(2)  Procedures arranged for the resale to competitors of gas volumes held by the 
historical operators.
(3)  In accordance with their public service obligations, the DNOs are the supplier of 
last resort for customers in difficulties whose supply contract has been cancelled 
by their supplier : this may concern protected customers qualifying for the social 
tariff, defaulting customers, customers waiting for a budget meter to be installed, 
etc.
(4)  For the purpose of assessing the retail market situation, market shares based on 
access points are more relevant than those based on the energy supplied, as the 
latter attach too much weight to (larger) business users as opposed to residential 
consumers, since these statistics make no distinction between the two.41
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The analysis which follows concentrates on the methods 
of pricing energy (excluding distribution costs and taxes) 
for consumers in the residential sector (private customers).
2.  Impact of liberalisation on market 
developments and the pricing of 
energy
2.1  Transition from regulated tariffs to free tariff 
formulas for energy costs
Before liberalisation, the prices charged to consum-
ers were based on agreements negotiated within the 
Electricity and Gas Control Committee (CCEG), between 
the social partners and the energy sector comprising the 
historical gas and electricity suppliers – who were at that 
time also responsible for transmission – and the local 
distribution companies. These tariffs, negotiated and 
recommended by the CCEG, were then endorsed by the 
government.
2.1.1  Electricity and Gas Control Committee
Established by an agreement in 1955, the CCEG aimed to 
“ensure that the technical, economic and tariff situation 
and developments in the electricity and gas sectors are 
geared to the public interest and conform to the overall 
energy policy”. The CCEG was abolished on 1 July 2003.
The negotiated tariff was a single all-in price which 
guaranteed the same price for all customers in the same 
consumption class regardless of their location. This tariff 
recommended by the CCEG was indexed monthly by 
reference to parameters reflecting the movement in costs 
comprising a proportional term relating to the purchase 
price of imported gas at the border, as indicated by the 
sales formula of the historical supplier, Distrigas, for public 
distribution, with :
–   an annual standing charge = (a x IGD)
–   a variable charge = (b x IGA) + (c x IGD)
    intended to cover gas import costs and other associated 
supply costs.
The gas acquisition index IGA reflected the movement 
in the natural gas price paid to public distribution and 
aimed to mirror the indexation of the long-term supply 
contracts on the international markets. Its publication 
ceased in November 2007, and all suppliers now use their 
own indexation formulas. The gas distribution index IGD 
reflects the movement in distribution costs other than 
those relating to the acquisition of gas (wages, overheads, 
return on capital employed, etc.). The current IGD is 
chArt 2  resellers active on the natural gas retail market
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Sources : NBB, CREG – CWaPE – BRUGEL – VREG (2010).
*    In most cases, the “other” suppliers are resellers serving business users, namely Distrigas, EDF Belgium, GDF-Suez, Wingas and Eneco België. In contrast, Elektriciteitsbedrijf 
Merksplas and Dong Energy Sales also serve private customers in the Flemish Region.42
defined by the Ministerial Decree of 12 December 2001, 
and is published monthly on the website of the federal 
regulator (CREG). It is still being used by all suppliers and 
is the same for all of them :
IGD = 0,44 + (0.31 x S) + (0.25 x M)
with :   S = AGORIA reference labour cost index 
M = equipment cost index.
The values of the coefficients a, b and c make it possible 
to set differential tariffs for the various consumption 
classes.
2.1.2  Tariff formulas applied to gas
2.1.2.1    January 2007 : full liberalisation of the Belgian market 
and freedom to set tariffs for energy costs
Following the full liberalisation of the Belgian market, 
each supplier is free to define its own tariff formulas for 
the energy cost, and in particular to define the parameters 
and coefficients used in variable-price contracts for the 
supply of energy. The indexation adopted by suppliers 
retains the indexation formula which the CCEG used to 
apply, with :
  – an annual standing charge = (a x IGD)
–    energy cost (proportional charge) = (b x Igm) + (c x IGD)
where a, b and c are tariff coefficients specific to each 
supplier, each tariff formula and each consumption class ;
IGD = the gas distribution index reflecting the movement 
in distribution costs other than those relating to gas pur-
chases, described above ;
Igm or GPI = an index reflecting movements in the cost 
of purchasing natural gas. Since full liberalisation of the 
market, that index has been calculated by each supplier 
instead of the former gas acquisition index.
Tariffs vary between suppliers in regard to :
–   indexation formulas for the purchase of gas (coef-
ficients and criteria underlying the former IGA = Igm 
or GPI) ;
–    and the tariff coefficients a, b and c, so that the indexed 
prices of each supplier may vary in their sensitivity to 
movements in the parameters.
These elements influence both the annual standing 
charge and the cost of energy. The rest of the analysis 
concentrates on this last component. The tariff formulas 
are detailed in Annex 1 for the consumption class rang-
ing between 5,001 and 30,000 kWh per annum, which 
corresponds to the use of gas for cooking and heating. 
This class also tallies most closely with the consump-
tion band D2 corresponding to annual consumption 
between 20 and 200 GJ (5,555 to 55,555 kWh), used 
by Eurostat for its half-yearly monitoring of household 
gas prices.
The Igm indexation formulas used by suppliers for the 
purchase costs of gas are very similar, and of the type  : 
(0.25 HUB + 0.0468 GOL603 + x * (CPIy–1 / CPIy–2) + y) / 
21.21479
–   (HUB), the price of forward contracts for gas traded 
on the Zeebrugge hub, reflecting the movement in the 
cost of spot gas purchases. The introduction of this 
parameter in relation to the former IGA formula also 
coincided with the end of the supply contract between 
Distrigas (the historical wholesale market supplier) and 
Algeria, and its replacement at the beginning of 2007 
by a contract with Qatar (CREG, 2008a) ;
–   (GOL603), the price of gasoil, which reflects the move-
ment in the cost of purchases under other long-term 
contracts by Distrigas, indexed after a time lag to the 
price of oil / petroleum products ;
–    (CPly), the consumer price index, which determines the 
general movement in prices of other purchases ;
–   x, the weighting coefficient applied to the CPI at the 
option of each supplier ;
–    y, a constant, independent of the parameters and freely 
chosen by each supplier ;
–   21.21479, a reference value used in the calculation of 
the old IGA index (CREG, 2006).
The differences between indexation formulas concern :
–   whether or not account is taken of the consumer price 
index : the CPI is not used by all suppliers (index adjusted 
annually)  ; if it is not taken into account, a higher co  - 
efficient c is usually assigned to the IGD in compensation ;
–    the use of a constant y allowing the price to be adjusted 
independently of the parameters (HUB, GOL and CPI).
It is notable that the “0.25 HUB + 0.0468 GOL603” 
component has appeared at some point in the indexation 
formulas of all these suppliers. As pointed out by the fed-
eral regulator, if – as the suppliers claim – their indexation 
formula reflects the movement in the natural gas acquisi-
tion cost, it is reasonable to assume that this component 
is present in the purchase contracts which they concluded 
(at the time) with the historical importer on the wholesale 
market (CREG, 2007).
2.1.2.2    October 2007 : the historical gas supplier uses the 
freedom to set tariffs...
In June 2007, the historical gas supplier on the retail 
market, Electrabel Customer Solutions (ECS), announced 
that, following the increase in energy prices on the inter-
national markets, new prices would apply with effect 
from September 2007. In the end, the revised prices were 
not introduced until October 2007 owing to confused 
communication with customers. The context of this price 
rise deserves some explanation.43
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The initial months of the full liberalisation of the Belgian 
gas market coincided with a decline in fossil fuel prices 
on the international markets in relation to 2006. This 
adverse trend in both the GOL and the HUB depressed 
the margin of operators acting as agents by the amount 
of the part of the energy price linked to those (declining) 
parameters, since their energy selling price is structured 
as follows  : b (0.25 HUB + 0.0468 GOL603) + b (ΔCPI) + 
b (constant y) + c IGD. In order to distinguish themselves 
from others, suppliers choose their own value of the 
coefficients b and c and the constant y to cover their gas 
import costs and other supply costs, and to include their 
margin.
The withdrawal in January 2007 of the IGA formula 
which had applied before liberalisation and its replace-
ment by the GPI parameter led to an average decline in 
the selling price, compared to the price using the IGA, of 
0.45 cents per kWh (excluding VAT) over the period from 
January 2007 to September 2007. The indexation formu-
las adopted in January 2007 in fact refer to two energy 
parameters which followed a trend unfavourable to the 
operators. The cumulative effects of this in the first half of 
2007 led to a reduction in the variable part of their price, 
and possibly their margin (all other things being equal, 
particularly the gas purchase conditions).
Since the selling price, and possibly the margin, applied 
by resellers can be adjusted by changing the value of 
the coefficients b and c and  /  or that of the constant, this 
means in particular that the price comprises :
–   a variable element, proportionate to the fuel price   
(GOL and HUB) and the CPI ;
–   a fixed element unaffected by movements in the 
parameters, which is the difference between the   
old constant and the new one (or more precisely   
b x Δ constant).
The change in the historical supplier’s indexation formula 
with effect from October 2007 concerns the constant in 
the indexation formula and represents a permanent price 
increase of 0.66 cents per kWh (0.8 cents per kWh includ-
ing VAT), regardless of the movement in fuel prices. Its 
immediate application leads to a realignment of the 
monthly price at the end-2006 level, just before the full 
liberalisation of the market (see chart 4).
Caution must be applied to any extrapolation of the 
effects of this selling price rise on the reseller’s margin, 
because everything depends on developments concerning 
chArt 3  trenD in gol603, hub anD igD parameters 
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Source : CREG.
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Source : Own calculations based on (ICEDD, 2009a) and (CREG, 2006).44
the reseller’s upstream purchasing conditions, both on 
the exchanges and in bilateral contracts (for which the 
prices are not disclosed). The reseller’s margin remains 
unchanged if the selling price rise merely passes on the 
change in the price affecting its purchase portfolio. In its 
(confidential) report on the link between costs and prices 
of importers and resellers on the Belgian residential and 
business market in natural gas over the period 2004-2009, 
the CREG mentioned three factors behind the increase in 
free market prices in recent years  : the rise in oil product 
prices, the increase in the profit margin of the main gas 
supplier, and the variable increase in the profit margin of 
the leading natural gas importer (CREG, 2010a).
Table 1 shows the market shares held by operators active 
in 2007 as sellers on the wholesale and retail markets 
(supplies via transmission and distribution networks) 
expressed in terms of the volumes traded. By comparing 
the shares of the various players on these two markets, 
and assuming that the operators give priority to selling 
the volumes at their disposal on the retail market, it is 
evident that among the operators active on this market, 
ECS, SPE, Nuon and Lampiris had to buy on the wholesale 
market (indexed bilateral contracts and  /  or spot market 
purchases). Their share of sales on the retail market is 
in fact higher than their share, if any, on the wholesale 
market. In the case of Essent, the available statistics are 
inconclusive.
In 2007, it could be said that resellers other than the 
historical supplier were price takers in a context in which :
–   on the wholesale market, the importer Distrigas had a 
dominant share of sales (78.2  % by volume)  ; Distrigas 
itself obtained most of its supplies on the basis of long-
term contracts with producers, accounting for 90  % 
of its supply portfolio in 2007 (Distrigas, 2008). At the 
level of the overall supply portfolio of suppliers active 
in Belgium, contracts with producers for a term of 
over 5 years still represented 71.3  % of the volume of 
imports in 2009 (CREG, 2010a) ;
–   and the historical operator on the retail market, ECS, 
supplied 72.4 % of the access points on the distribution 
network in 2007  (1).
Obliged to buy on contractual conditions similar to those 
of the historical operator in relation to the importer 
Distrigas, and facing sales competition from the tariffs 
offered by the historical operator to retail market cus-
tomers, most “alternative” resellers had limited room for 
manoeuvre on the retail market. In these circumstances, 
the price increase in October 2007 seems to have created 
a margin sufficient for all resellers, and big enough for 
the historical operator’s competitors to take up a posi-
tion within that margin. It could be said that the market 
has a margin setter and margin takers, the “basic price” 
of gas and movements in that price being determined 
by the structure of the resellers’ indexation formulas, 
which themselves reflect the indexation formulas applied 
to some of the purchase transactions on the wholesale 
market (the long-term contracts with producers).
The change in the tariff formula was announced at a time 
when the indexation parameters used (GOL and HUB) 
were at their lowest level. That tariff increase, unrelated 
to the movement in fuel prices, therefore restored the 
price to a level already reached in the past. In fact, the 
prices announced in June 2007 in the price list effective 
from 1 September 2007 were based on the May 2007 
monthly parameters (the delay was to do with the obliga-
tion on resellers to notify consumers of changes to their 
contracts). The prices announced in the (revised) price list 
as at 1 October 2007 were based on the September 2007 
monthly parameters. The only autonomous increase in 
the parameters used in the new GPI between May and 
September 2007 led to an increase in the monthly price 
of 0.20 cents per kWh (excluding VAT).
The discretionary adjustment to the constant in the gas 
price indexation formula enables the historical operator 
on the retail market to consolidate a price which is inde-
pendent of the movement in the underlying parameters 
while retaining the freedom to pass on any changes in 
the provisions of its purchase contracts detrimental to 
the competitiveness of its retail selling prices in relation 
Table  1  Market shares of operators active  
as sellers on the wholesale and retail  
Markets – 2007
(percentages of the total volumes traded)
 
Wholesale market  
(supply)
 
Market for sales to end-users  
(via the transmission and distribution  
networks)
 
Distrigaz = 78.2 Distrigas = 45.1
ECS = 28.6
GDF = 15.2 GDF = 10.0
Wingas = 6.0 Wingas = 6.0
Essent = 0.5 Other (EDF, Essent, Dong,  
Nuon, Lampiris) = 3.8 EDF Belgium = 0.1
SPE = start 12 / 2007 SPE = 6.5
Source : CREG – CWaPE – BRUGEL – VREG (2008).
 
(1)  For the purpose of assessing the retail market situation, market shares based on 
access points are more relevant than those based on the energy supplied.45
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to rival suppliers. In practice, the relative competitiveness 
of ECS prices compared to those of its competitors was 
restored, as those competitors in turn made discretionary 
adjustments to their retail prices, as described in the next 
section.
2.1.2.3  ... followed by its competitors on the retail market
In January 2007, all suppliers adjusted their tariff formulas 
for the energy price indexation on the basis of the formula 
which applied to them for their purchases on the whole-
sale market, the rules on the application of those formulas 
being in line with those used previously during the period 
of regulation. Subsequently, all suppliers adjusted their 
indexation formulas as they saw fit, changing the coef-
ficients of the parameters and / or the constant, or – more 
recently – changing the parameters.
For the suppliers, automatic indexation is convenient 
because part of the price risk is automatically passed 
on to the customer without further notification. Under 
Article 74 of the Law of 6 April 2010 on market practices 
and consumer protection, price indexation clauses are 
permitted “so long as they are not unlawful and the price 
adjustment method is explicitly described in the contract”. 
Also, if the suppliers’ purchase conditions are changed, 
or if their margin is affected by an adverse development, 
they are free to adjust the corresponding weighting coef-
ficients without incurring significant public information 
expenses. The said law contains rules on the notification 
of these changes, stipulating that in the event of a uni-
lateral price increase or change in the conditions to the 
detriment of consumers, the latter are entitled to put an 
end to the contract free of charge. That right is stipulated 
in the contracts and can be exercised on the anniversary 
of the contract, i.e. at least annually (no suppliers specify 
a period of less than one year in their contracts), giving 
due notice.
Nevertheless, the disclosure of indexation formulas 
required by law does ensure some transparency com-
pared to the situation in other countries (see below) 
because it is possible to deduce the relative importance of 
the various components and to anticipate how they may 
change. By analysing the movement in these formulas 
and the successive adjustments to them, it is also possible 
to ascertain how the resellers’ margins have changed, 
independently of the movement in the underlying param-
eters. However, precise analysis of these margins would 
require access to information concerning the gas pur-
chasing conditions and other costs relating to supply. In 
that regard, verification of the representativeness of the 
indices used in terms of cost movements, and the justi-
fication for the successive adjustments made to them, 
falls within the competence of the sector’s regulator and 
that of the competition authorities as bodies considering 
appeals against decisions by the regulator  (1). At present, 
it must be said that this information is not accessible and 
will become more complicated to obtain than in the past, 
with the involvement of multiple operators for whom the 
relevant market is not – or is no longer – confined to the 
domestic market.
Among the resellers, Lampiris is notable for an indexation 
formula adopted in January 2009 in which the propor-
tional charge refers to the IGD for supply costs, and solely 
to the TTF (index in €  /  MWh weighted by the volume of 
transactions on forward contracts for natural gas in the 
Netherlands for delivery in the following month) in regard 
to gas import costs  (2). Since January 2009, Lampiris has 
stopped buying from Distrigas and switched to the Dutch 
group Eneco under a multi-annual contract linked to the 
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by ecs, spe-luminus, nuon, lampiris anD 
essent For the consumption class 5,001 to 







2007 2008 2009 2010

























Sources : Own calculations based on price lists and CREG (2010b).
(1)  In some respects, the functions of the two institutions are closely linked, the 
regulator being responsible for opening up the sector to competition, while 
the competition authorities are in charge of maintaining that competition on 
the basis of national law (Law on the Protection of Economic Competition) 
and Community competition law (Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union).
(2)  Since the second quarter of 2008, SPE-Luminus has also offered a variable-price 
contract partly linked to the gas price in Zeebrugge (weighted monthly average 
for day-ahead delivery – see Annex 1), alongside the HUB and the GOL.46
TTF price (De Boeck, 2008). In so doing, Lampiris designed 
its consumer price indexation formula on the lines of 
the one agreed with its new supplier on the wholesale 
market. The adjustment of its sale price indexation for-
mulas in accordance with the indexation applied in its 
purchase contracts therefore conforms to the principle of 
transferring the price risk to the consumer.
Nonetheless, this change of supplier on the wholesale 
market with a new gas reference price used for index-
ation enables Lampiris to offer lower retail prices than its 
competitors in the current context of low gas prices on 
the exchanges, unconnected for now with the price of 
oil. That situation is due to the coexistence of two pric-
ing mechanisms on the European wholesale markets. It 
must be remembered that, historically, the supply of the 
wholesale market in continental Europe is based largely 
on long-term bilateral contracts concluded with producers 
on a take-or-pay basis as far as volumes were concerned, 
and also incorporating a price indexation clause. Those 
clauses refer to the price of competing fuels on the sales 
markets (oil and its derivatives, and coal) with a lag of 
3 to 6 months. Moreover, the development of the gas 
exchanges led to gas market prices representative of 
supply and demand conditions. The conditions currently 
prevailing on the gas market feature excess supply – due 
to the entry into service of gas liquefaction lines and 
sustained output of non-conventional gas in the United 
States – combined with demand still affected by the crisis. 
These developments depressed the market price of gas 
while the equilibrium on the oil market did not exhibit the 
same effects. Consequently, the spot market price for gas 
is depressed in relation to the gas price indexed to the oil 
price and used in the long-term contracts, which implicitly 
form the benchmark for the indexation formulas of the 
other suppliers. It is still questionable whether this gap 
will persist and whether the natural gas price will become 
uncoupled from the oil price (IEA, 2010).
2.1.2.4  Implications for consumers
Regardless of the operator, the tariff formulas with auto-
matic monthly indexation implicitly pass on all or part 
of the price risk to the end-users, whose only means of 
protection is a fixed-price contract.
The fixed-term contracts currently offered by suppliers 
active on the Belgian residential market all have a mini-
mum term of one year at an index-linked or fixed price  (1). 
That implies, in particular, that customers wanting to see 
suppliers compete, or simply wishing to hedge against 
the price risk by concluding a fixed-price contract, cannot 
do so without incurring additional costs except on the 
anniversary of their annual contract. When the contract is 
signed, the fixed price is generally higher than the variable 
price because it includes a margin enabling the supplier 
to deal with the uncertainty over future price movements. 
Nonetheless, depending on the subsequent movement in 
the variable price over the term of the contract, the fixed 
price may be lower than the corresponding variable price 
in a given month. There are therefore more favourable 
moments when consumers wishing to hedge against price 
volatility can do so at lower cost. Customers have the best 
chance of compensating for the differential between the 
variable and fixed prices if they conclude a fixed-price 
contract at a time of low variable prices. That period 
should preferably coincide with the contract cancellation 
date if consumers want to keep their costs down.
In regard to the duration of supply contracts, the Verivox 
information portal for German consumers considers a 
contract to be more attractive to consumers the shorter its 
term and the shorter the period of notice of termination 
(Verivox, 2010). In Germany, 33  % of the tariffs analysed 
by that body  (2) have a first contract term of one month, 
renewable on a monthly basis in 71  % of cases. Half of 
these monthly contracts are default supply contracts, the 
suppliers being appointed for a period specified by law  ; 
the contracts can therefore be terminated automatically 
on a monthly basis. Commercial contracts are increasingly 
offered for a one-year term with a statutory maximum of 
two years. On expiry of the commercial contract, consum-
ers can always revert to a default supply contract. Prices 
are not published via an indexation formula  (3) but at 
less frequent intervals (the main reason being the menu 
costs entailed in adjusting prices) via notification of the 
customer, generally six weeks in advance. Such flexibility 
in the contracts makes it absolutely essential to have an 
efficient infrastructure for the transmission of consump-
tion data between the various market players.
Finally, if indexation formulas refer to the gas price on 
the spot markets on a monthly basis, they make prices 
more volatile than if they refer to oil prices derived 
from the average prices over the six months preceding 
the quarter in question. The transmission of gas spot 
price fluctuations is speeded up in comparison with the 
(smoothed) fluctuations in oil prices. However, over the 
period 2007-2009, the impact of this adjustment was 
modest in comparison with the general movement in 
(1)  Elektriciteitsbedrijf Merksplas, a supplier active in Flanders, offers a contract 
for an indefinite period which can be cancelled at a minimum of one month’s 
notice on payment of cancellation fees. The basic contracts offered by ECS and 
SPE-Luminus (respectively ECS Basic Deal and Luminus Standard) are also for an 
indefinite period and can be cancelled on those terms.
(2)  The Verivox study covers 1248 tariff formulas offered to businesses (596 tariffs) 
and residential customers (652 tariffs) by the 100 biggest resellers active on the 
German retail market.
(3)  Except for eight tariff formulas in which the price is indexed to the heating oil 
price (Verivox, 2010).47
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consumer prices of gas (Cornille, 2009). The range of the 
variations is in fact also due to the weighting accorded to 
each of the components.
2.2  Contribution of the various pricing components 
to gas price movements
The movement in gas prices (proportional charge) is 
shown in chart 6 according to the various successive 
tariff formulas adjusted by the historical operator in 
January 2007, October 2007 and January 2010. The 
permanent price increase represented by the constant is 
clearly visible from October 2007  ; without that adjust-
ment, domestic consumers would currently be paying the 
same price as in January 2007. The change of formula 
has created an asymmetric price pattern, so that the price 
does not revert to its previous level despite the reduction 
in the level of the parameters. Any subsequent reversal of 
the price trend will therefore only be passed on in part.
On the basis of the published indexation formulas and 
with application of the successive values of the param-
eters used, it was possible to reconstruct the monthly 
movement in the indexed price by identifying the com-
ponents relating to each parameter which together make 
up the price published in the price lists as far as the 
proportional charge is concerned. For completeness, it 
would be necessary to take account of the annual stand-
ing charge expressed per kWh. In the class considered, 
using between 5,001 and 30,000 kWh  /  yr, that currently 
represents an additional cost of respectively 0.77 to 
0.13 cent  /  kWh excluding VAT in the consumption band 
in question (shown pro memoria in chart 7 for consump-
tion of 23,260 kWh / yr, but not included in the published 
tariff).
The constant incorporated into the indexation formula 
with a negative sign has the effect of reducing the overall 
price (blue line) in relation to the sum of the other formula 
components. The increase in the constant from –7.86 to 
–1.3 attenuates that reduction effect.
The change in the price compared to an earlier period is 
represented in the following charts by a continuous line. 
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Source : Own calculations.
GPI1  =   indexation during the period 01 / 01 / 2007 – 31 / 08 / 2007 (postponed to 
30 / 09 / 2007)
  = 0.25 HUB + 0.0468 GOL + 4.83 ΔCPI – 7.86
GPI2   =   indexation during the period 01 / 10 / 2007 – 31 / 12 / 2009 = increase in the 
constant in the indexation formula
  = 0.25 HUB + 0.0468 GOL + 4.83 ΔCPI – 1.30
GPI2’  =   current indexation since 01 / 01 / 2010 = reduction in the coefficient applicable 
to the CPI
  = 0.25 HUB + 0.0468 GOL + 4.63 ΔCPI – 1.30
  and incorporation of the 2 % reduction in the price per kWh invoiced under the 
EnergyPlus contract : 
2.13 GPI + 0.1768 IGD = basic deal for ECS gas 30 
2.0874 GPI + 0.1733 IGD = ECS EnergyPlus deal
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Source : Own calculations.48
The contributions of the various price components to that 
change are represented by stacked bars.
The monthly price change is first influenced by the volatil-
ity of the GOL603 parameter (average of prices over the 
six months immediately preceding the quarter concerned) 
which may change every three months. The HUB param-
eter is taken into account every month, but has a less 
marked influence on the price than the GOL owing to the 
lower weighting of the HUB in the price formula.
Since January 2007, there has been a permanent price 
increase following the change in the constant and, in 
2008, that was accompanied by the increase in oil and 
gas prices. Without that change, the price level from the 
second quarter of 2009 would have been lower than in 
January 2007 (by ± 20 to 30 percentage points) instead of 
gradually increasing (asymmetric price pattern).
In 2008, the year-on-year change in the price was first 
influenced by the price rise caused by the revision of the 
constant. Then came the increase in the energy param-
eters, the price in August 2008 having doubled compared 
to its 2007 level. One-third of that increase was then still 
attributable to the constant. In 2009, the changes were 
due entirely to the energy parameters. The slightly nega-
tive contribution associated with the CPI from January 
2010 is due to the impact of the reduction in the trans-
mission charge included in the energy price (see Annex 1).
2.3  Comparison of the energy prices charged by 
ECS, SPE-Luminus, Nuon, Lampiris and Essent
Since January 2007, retail-market suppliers to private cus-
tomers have made use of their freedom to set prices on a 
number of occasions, leading to gas price changes unre-
lated to the underlying parameters. The comparison was 
conducted for the five leading suppliers whose respective 
market shares for sales via the distribution network are 
shown in chart 2. In 2009, the five suppliers considered 
represented 96 % of the access points.
The main tariff adjustments made by these suppliers are 
detailed in Annex 1, which also sets out the changes in 
the energy price stated in their price lists. These figures are 
illustrated for each of them by a thick blue line, the thin-
ner lines showing the prices which would have applied if 
chArt 8  contribution oF the components to the 
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the tariff formulas adopted successively had been main-
tained. The stacked bar charts which follow show the 
monthly prices with a breakdown between the various 
components corresponding to each parameter, which 
together make up the price published in the price lists in 
relation to the proportional charge.
These charts reproduce the unit energy prices quoted 
in the suppliers’ price lists as published on their website 
and notified to the regulators for statistical and moni-
toring purposes. However, it must be pointed out that 
the monthly prices used for invoicing are those based 
on the values of the parameters corresponding to the 
consumption month  ; they are plotted with a dotted line 
with a delay of one to two months against the date of 
the published price, which itself is based on parameters 
which applied one to two months earlier. The index values 
are in fact not known until the beginning of each month, 
whereas the price lists must be sent out during the month 
preceding implementation of the prices.
It should be noted that – in the case of three of these sup-
pliers – it would have been more advantageous to the con-
sumers if the first set of tariffs introduced in January 2007 
had been retained (see charts in Annex 1 – thin grey line 
below the thick blue line). The indexation adjustment 
made by Lampiris is the only one which became more 
favourable than that adopted in January 2007. A similar 
finding is true in the case of the new variable-price con-
tracts offered since then, such as the Luminus Connect 
contract introduced in 2008, which referred partly to 
the Zeebrugge DAH gas price. The Essent Eco contract 
launched in October 2010 offers a price with indexation 
comparable to that adopted by Lampiris (see Annex 1). 
The same applies to the contract offered by the newcomer 
on the Belgian market from October 2010, Octa+.
At the level of the contributions of the various compo-
nents, the changes made to the tariff formulas as regards 
indices and / or weightings have had the effect of increas-
ing the stable part of the tariff, i.e. excluding the parts 
linked to the energy parameters HUB, GOL and HFO which 
are more prone to fluctuation. The CPI is in fact adjusted 
annually, the IGD is an index which rises gradually, and the 
constant is only changed by discretionary decision. Since 
January 2007, this stable base has increased in the case of 
four operators (at Nuon it is relatively constant but already 
high) and now represents between 0.50 and 0.85 cents 
per kWh (excluding VAT). The top of this range is seen 
in the case of Lampiris where the stable IGD component 
represents up to 49  % of the total price (depending on 
the movement in the TTF)  (1).
These changes led to a permanent increase regardless 
of the movement in the energy price parameters on the 
international markets, and may be part of the reason for 
the deterioration in the gas price level compared to that 
seen in neighbouring countries, leaving aside the effect 
of the increase in gas transmission and distribution costs 
which is not discussed in this article  (2).
2.4  Freedom to set prices in Belgium
The division of powers between the various levels of 
authority also has an impact on the freedom to set 
prices available to players on the gas market. In the 
case of transmission and distribution tariffs, the federal 
authorities intervene via the federal regulator, which 
checks whether the tariff offers submitted to it by the 
transmission and distribution companies conform to the 
set methodology. The energy price is not regulated, but 
may be capped if appropriate by decision of the federal 
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Source : Own calculations.
(1)  It should be noted that the increase in the coefficient applied to the annual 
standing charge (a x IGD) by Essent in January 2008 (see Annex 1 and 
CREG (2010b)) also represents an increase in stable revenue, but proportionate  
to the number of access points (and not to the volumes supplied).
(2)  See Cornille D. (2009), “Methodology or pricing : what is the reason for the 
greater volatility of consumer gas and electricity prices ?”, NBB, Economic Review, 
for a more detailed analysis of this question.50
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*  In its price lists, Nuon refers to the value of the parameters in m–2 instead of m–1.51
implicAtions of liBErAlisAtion for mEthods  
of sEtting rEtAil gAs pricEs in BElgium
authorities, after obtaining the opinion of the federal 
regulator  (1). The powers of the Regions relate, among 
other things, to certain public service obligations  (2). It is 
against that backdrop that the decree by the Walloon 
government concerning public service obligations in the 
gas market specifies that, on invoices for gas supplies, 
“the supplier shall notify his standard supply contract 
and any adjustments to it to the CWaPE. No standard 
contract may enter into force without prior notification 
to the CWaPE”. For Brussels, the regulator BRUGEL has 
not stipulated any similar obligation. In Flanders, the 
regional regulator stipulates that the VREG has no author-
ity to pass legally binding decisions on contractual and 
commercial aspects of commitments between suppliers 
and consumers. In these areas, it is necessary to refer to 
contract law and to the sectoral agreement concluded in 
March 2005 between energy suppliers and the Consumer 
Protection Minister entitled “The consumer in the liberal-
ised electricity and gas market” (FPS Economy, 2008)  (3).
Under its consumer protection powers, the Federal State 
has in fact negotiated a binding agreement with the 
suppliers on their trade practices. The agreement covers 
issues such as price transparency, marketing and selling 
techniques, changes of supplier, general conditions, infor-
mation for consumers and the handling of complaints ; in 
particular, it stipulates that “unilateral changes to essential 
conditions or changes to energy or gas prices on the basis 
of factors dependent solely on the will of the supplier are 
prohibited”. Failure to comply with that agreement can be 
reported to the special federal mediation service for the 
energy sector (mediation service set up at FPS Economy, 
SMEs, Self-employed and Energy).
The extension of the CREG’s area of competence imple-
mented under the Law of 8 June 2008 enables it to 
conduct permanent monitoring of the gas and electricity 
markets, in regard to both market operation and prices, 
including supply prices. In particular, Article 15  /  14ter 
specifies that “the prices offered by a natural gas com-
pany must be objectively justified in relation to the costs 
incurred”. If the regulator identifies infringements, it may 
on its own initiative submit a report to the minister setting 
out its findings and recommended measures. The CREG 
reports alleged infringements to the Competition Council, 
submitting its report and the necessary confidential infor-
mation (CREG, 2009). The regional regulators are respon-
sible, under their public service obligations, for informing 
consumers of the prices offered by the suppliers, including 
the obligation to present an objective comparison. So, 
just before the end of each month, as input for the price 
simulators set up by the regional regulators, the suppliers 
notify the price lists for the following month based on the 
value of the parameters for the current month.
3.  Do other countries also grant as 
much freedom to set retail prices ?
The process of gas market liberalisation launched at 
European level is following different agendas in the 
various national markets and is based on arrangements 
determined autonomously by the national authorities  (4). 
This leads to levels of (de)regulation which vary from one 
country to another and which also affect the scope for 
competition. That scope in turn depends on the com-
petition conditions on the wholesale markets upstream, 
which determine the conditions on which the suppliers 
obtain gas, be it via bilateral contracts, purchases on the 
exchanges or auction procedures. The operators active on 
the national markets have adapted to the rules on their 
respective markets, notably where pricing is concerned. 
Thus, the Belgian pricing policy based on automatic 
monthly indexation formulas common to all operators 
active on the residential market means that changes con-
nected with the underlying energy parameters are passed 
on automatically in the gas price invoiced to the domestic 
consumer. The proportion of variable-price contracts con-
cerned represents around 93.2  % of the contracts con-
cluded by households as at October 2009 (CREG, 2010c). 
This pricing policy – which is rather specific to Belgium – is 
one explanation for the greater volatility of consumer 
prices of gas and the rapid transmission of changes in gas 
import prices to consumer prices (in which the indexation 
formulas are governed by the same principles), points 
already noted elsewhere (Baugnet and Dury, 2010).
The above analysis emphasises the freedom to set prices 
which resellers enjoy on the retail market in Belgium. If 
these prices are compared at international level, the ques-
tion remains to what extent that freedom to set prices 
also exists in other countries, and whether it is based on 
similar arrangements.
3.1  From varying levels of regulation to simple 
retail price monitoring
In July 2007, the European Regulators’ Group for Electricity 
and Gas (ERGEG) conducted an initial survey among the 
regulators to assess the effective liberalisation of gas 
and electricity prices by ascertaining whether regulated 
prices persist in segments which are nevertheless open 
(1)  Article 15 / 10 of the Law of 12 April 1965 on the transport of gaseous and other 
products by pipeline. 
(2)  Public service obligations according to the Gas Directive 2003 / 55 / EC – Article 3(2) 
– “Member States may impose on undertakings operating in the gas sector, in the 
general economic interest, public service obligations which may relate to security, 
including security of supply, regularity, quality and price of supplies, and environ-
mental protection, including energy efficiency and climate protection.”
(3)  The latest version of this agreement was supplemented in June 2008, and 
entered into force on 15 December 2008.
(4)  For an appraisal of the current situation, see EC (2010), Report on progress in 
creating the internal gas and electricity market.52
to competition. That survey was updated in July 2008 
(ERGEG, 2009) and January 2010 (ERGEG, 2010).
The survey reveals that, in regard to the residential 
market, Belgium is among the Member States where gas 
and electricity prices are not subject to regulation in the 
sense defined by ERGEG (see definition below).
Apart from Belgium, the Member States where retail 
prices of gas and electricity are totally liberalised (accord-
ing to ERGEG) are Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, 
Luxembourg, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
In Finland, only electricity prices have been liberalised  (1).
3.1.1  Definition of a regulated retail price
ERGEG considers that a regulated retail price is a price which 
is regulated (or controlled) by a public authority, rather than 
a price established solely by supply and demand. Such regu-
lation may take various forms  : price-setting or approval, 
maximum prices, or a combination of those measures.
Despite the proclaimed full liberalisation of their retail 
markets, a number of Member States continue to regulate 
energy prices on this segment, justifying that policy by the 
need to protect vulnerable consumers. In ERGEG’s opinion, 
that protection should not be provided by regulated prices 
applicable to some or all of the customers. However, the 
obligation to relinquish such provisions in the long term is 
open to interpretation : a recent judgment by the European 
Court of Justice (Case C-265 / 08 – 20 April 2010) confirms 
that, under certain conditions, the Directive on the internal 
gas market does not preclude national legislation making 
temporary provision for setting the price level for the 
supply of natural gas to final consumers.
3.1.2  ERGEG’s position on regulated retail prices
ERGEG’s position comprises a number of points :
–   in the long term, regulated retail prices are incompat-
ible with a competitive environment, and ERGEG is 
urging the adoption of scenarios in which these regu-
lated prices are gradually phased out ;
–   ERGEG recognises that competition entails close super-
vision in order to ensure that customers are treated 
fairly, so that they can obtain the best terms and can 
exercise their freedom of choice in an open market. Yet 
regulated prices tend to distort the market ;
–   measures concerning social protection for vulnerable 
consumers must be in line with market principles ;
–    regulated prices can interfere with the operation of the 
wholesale and retail markets and send the wrong price 
signals to suppliers and consumers.
3.2  The situation in some neighbouring countries
The ERGEG analysis, summarised in Annex 2, shows that 
free pricing applies in all consumption segments of the 
Belgian gas market, without any regulation according to 
the ERGEG definition. Without claiming to be exhaustive, 
this section examines in more detail the natural gas prices 
offered to domestic consumers in neighbouring coun-
tries of North-Western Europe. Two groups of countries 
emerge :
–   countries with regulation  : France, the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Ireland  (2) ;
–   countries without regulation  : Germany, the United 
Kingdom, Luxembourg, Austria, Sweden, Finland.
The findings which emerge from that examination are 
summarised in three boxes with :
–   a brief description of the scope of gas price regulation 
in the residential sector, if any ;
–   the supervision measures which nevertheless exist in 
countries without regulation ;
–   the price indexation arrangements observed in all the 
countries analysed.
The scope of gas price regulation in the residential sector 
can be summarised as follows.
(1)  The Finnish gas market is in fact closed to competition under Article 28(1) of 
Directive 2003 / 55 / EC which exempts Finland from opening up the gas market so 
long as the country has no direct link to the EU gas network (EC, 2003).
(2)  Prices are considered to be regulated if there is any control by the authorities 
(price approval procedure, maximum prices) though the prices may still be freely 
set.
Box 1 – Scope of regulation
France – coexistence of regulated price deals and market price deals
Regulated price deals (90  % of residential locations, in volume) offered by the historical supplier GDF-Suez and 
22 local distribution companies (or less than 5 % of customers) – the regulated selling prices have to cover supply 
53
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costs and are fixed jointly by the ministers responsible for the economy and energy on the advice of the regulator 
(CRE).
Market price deals offered by five alternative suppliers alongside the historical supplier.
the netherlands – control procedure before any price change
Before any price is changed, there is a control procedure (safety net) to ensure the change is justified, with 
maximum prices imposed if appropriate.
These maximum prices correspond to the total purchase costs and a gross margin considered to be reasonable by 
the Energiekamer, which comes under the Minister for Economic Affairs and is based at the competition authority, 
Nma.
Denmark – maximum prices controlled by the regulator
Maximum prices for suppliers designated as having a default supply obligation in relation to customers who have 
not changed their supplier.
The maximum prices for the supply obligation are controlled by the regulator, DERA. They cover the costs plus a 
reasonable margin assessed by the regulator in the light of the efficiency achieved by the suppliers in the contracts 
for the purchase of gas (efficiency regulation).
ireland – maximum prices controlled and subject to review by the regulator
Maximum price fixed for 18-month periods (price may be reviewed by the regulator if he considers that to be in 
the consumers’ interests).
Determination of an average maximum tariff composed of the gas price, transmission and distribution costs, 
operating expenses and the supplier’s margin. Suppliers must take all possible steps to ensure that in any period 
of twelve successive months the average gas price does not exceed the maximum authorised by the regulator.
The regulator monitors market developments (report on competition), the decision to suspend that regulation 
depending on the competition situation.
The absence of regulation does not give operators total 
freedom ; rather, it is more of a supervised freedom.
Box 2 – Supervisory measures in countries without price regulation
germany
Free prices, but since 2008 the competition authorities have been able to bring proceedings on account of anti-
competitive practices, both at federal level (Bundeskartellamt in the case of trans-regional suppliers) and at the 
level of the Länder.
12 / 2007 : amendment of the legislation against restraints of competition in order to strengthen control over the 
existence of unfair prices in the energy sector. The Bundeskartellamt can investigate (and prosecute) a dominant 
undertaking on account of excessive prices, by demonstrating that other firms charge lower prices or that the price 
is disproportionate to the costs. The burden of proof rests with the undertaking in question.
54
03  /  2008  : 35 regional  /  local gas resellers were prosecuted on suspicion of having charged excessive retail prices 
in 2007 and 2008. In August 2008, the prosecution was halted because the resellers undertook to reimburse 
the customers and not to recoup the amounts in question by way of subsequent price increases (“no-repeated 
game”). The Bundeskartellamt oversees all the proceedings.
10  /  2009  : the Federal Court condemns a supplier for using an invalid contractual clause  : the price-matching 
clause allowed an immediate increase in prices in the event of a cost increase, but conversely made no provision 
for an obligation to cut prices if costs went down.
03 / 2010 : judgment of the Federal Court ruling that retail gas prices cannot depend exclusively on the price of oil 
(light heating oil), because that single link is unfavourable to customers and can lead to extra profits for suppliers 
(e.g. if transport or operating costs decline).
the united kingdom
Free pricing formulas (4,000 tariffs offered).
10 / 2008 : ex post analysis of the market situation (the Energy Supply Probe) under the direction of OFGEM (and 
of the regulator which is its supervisory authority) whose job is to protect the interests of consumers by promoting 
competition.
Following that analysis, introduction of a new condition for awarding supply licences, prohibiting unjustified tariff 
differentials  : prices must reflect the costs of the undertakings, and price differences must be objectively justified 
on the basis of costs or on other terms and conditions.
From 2009 : publication of Quarterly Wholesale / Retail Price Reports which include an analysis of the link between 
wholesale and retail prices.
Establishment of an independent body – Energywatch – to protect and promote the interests of gas and electricity 
consumers  : free, impartial information, registration of complaints, and use of the experience thus gained to 
inform the authorities on these aspects, by involving the regulator and the operators in such a way as to make 
them more receptive to the needs of consumers whenever any change is made to operators’ policies, procedures 
and systems.
luxembourg
Free pricing since 1 July 2007.
The regulator notes that “it does not have the legal means to conduct a survey of prices charged on the market”.
austria
Free pricing – indexation at irregular intervals by the suppliers but with clear and transparent notification (the same 
applies to invoices).
The regulator E-control has a legal mandate to check the transparency of invoices, and conducts analyses on the 
market situation jointly with the competition authority BWB.
sweden
Small market (44,400 households).
Finland
Finnish gas market closed pursuant to Article 28(1) of Directive 2003 / 55 / EC which exempts Finland from opening 
up its gas market so long as the country has no direct link with the EU gas network – small market.
Gas prices are not regulated as such  : there is no authority responsible for their approval or for fixing them in 
advance.55
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Box 3 – Indexation arrangements under variable-price contracts
France
Market deals = –x  % compared to the regulated prices = parallel changes.
Regulated standing charge for customers connected to the transmission network and customers connected to the 
distribution network consuming over 4 GWh / yr – changes every 3 months.
Regulated public distribution price for business and domestic customers connected to the distribution network 
and consuming less than 4 GWh / yr :
–    regulated tariffs of local distribution companies adjusted 4 times a year (1 January, 1 April, 1 July and 1 October) 
in line with the movement in costs. Ministers may ask a supplier to submit a new scale of charges on the 
recommendation of the CRE ;
–   GDF-Suez regulated prices adjusted (in theory) at unspecified times, but in practice they change according to 
GDF’s costs (proposal by GDF) and the “authorisation” obtained by the CRE  /  Ministry (public service contract). 
The government sets the selling prices at least once a year, but GDF is permitted to change them between two 
price decrees (on the recommendation of the CRE, according to an approved formula).
Publication in March 2009 of the formula for calculating GDF’s supply costs ; formula included in the public service 
contract and audited by the CRE for application during 2008 to 2010.
Δ supply costs of GDF-Suez = 1.3107 Δ exchange rate €  /  $ + 0.01988 ΔGOL(€  /  t) + 0.02652 ΔHFO(€  /  t) +   
0.06206 ΔBrent(€ / b) (1).
the netherlands
Obligation to inform the competition authority (NMa) of price changes four weeks in advance so that it can check 
whether the adjustments are reasonable (safety net) (NMa, 2009).
Contract formulas offered :
–   fixed-term at a fixed or variable price, with prices generally adjusted in January and July ;
–   indefinite-term and variable price with adjustment in January and July.
Denmark
Contract formulas offered :
–   variable price indexed to the price of petroleum products or to Nord Pool Gas price, adjusted monthly ;
–   price fixed for one or two years, with or without maximum prices.
ireland
Maximum price fixed for 18-month periods :
–   standard tariff with fixed charge and charge per kWh consumed ;
–   tariff with no fixed charge and two price levels (< and > 3,550 kWh) ;
–   “winter saver” tariff allowing big winter bills to be staggered ;
–   reduction for payment by direct debit.

The indexation arrangements concerning variable-price 
contracts can be summarised as follows.
(1)  April 2010 : with the emergence of a significant spot market (attractive in a context of spot prices below the long-term contract prices), the CRE was questioned 
about the absence of spot prices in the approved formula. A new audit was launched by the CRE (Europénergies, 2010a). Under this formula, a price increase for 
private customers was announced from 1 July 2010. Meanwhile (June 2010), the Minister for Economic Affairs asked that, after that rise, prices should remain 
unchanged until the CRE had completed its audit (Europénergies, 2010b). At the end of August 2010, the CRE confirmed that the existing formula offers a correct 
approximation of the supply costs of GDF-Suez, while stressing the need to consider a revision in order to take account of new developments : new indexations 
based on the spot price in long-term contracts and increased percentage of supplies obtained on the spot market (CRE, 2010). Some people warned that this could 
lead to greater price volatility (Pétrostratégies, 2010c).56
germany
Around 16,000 gas and electricity tariffs offered by 900 electricity resellers and 750 gas resellers.
Prices change as and when changes in market conditions so require  : adjustment authorised nach billigem 
Ermessen der Entwicklung der Kosten (according to a reasonable assessment of changes in costs).
the united kingdom
Retail prices adjusted at not too frequent intervals because of the costs entailed and the potential adverse effect 
on customer relations (consumers prefer stable prices).
Main types of tariffs :
–   tariff varying according to payment method  : “credit” tariff with invoicing at the end of each quarter, direct 
debit tariff with payment taken direct from the customer’s account, tariff for prepayment via a meter ;
–    dual fuel tariff offering a discount for customers buying both gas and electricity from the same supplier (amount 
fixed quarterly or annually) ;
–   fixed or capped tariff (limit that price will not exceed during a set period) ;
–    special tariff for vulnerable, low-income customers (voluntary agreement between OFGEM and suppliers for the 
financing of these tariffs).
luxembourg
Natural gas purchase price indexed to the price of petroleum products (fuel oil and heating oil) with quarterly 
indexation.
austria
Free price – indexation at irregular intervals by suppliers with obligation to publish clear, transparent information 
on price adjustments.
Rebates granted :
–   according to the payment method (direct debit) ;
–   for new customers ;
–   for brand loyalty (after a minimum period has elapsed) ;
–   for recommendation to new customers.
sweden
Annual contracts with a variable price adjusted quarterly, and fixed-price contracts for 1, 2 or 3 years.
It is clear that the interpretation and comparison of price 
movements is subject to the influence of regulation, 
which may still vary considerably in scope from one coun-
try to another.
According to economic principles, the operators’ selling 
price formulas reflect – or aim to reflect – the price struc-
ture of their purchase portfolio.
Except for Denmark (where maximum prices neverthe-
less apply), none of the countries analysed had any 
automatic monthly indexation mechanism like that 
adopted by all suppliers active in Belgium. Indexations 
take place on an ad hoc basis, at quarterly  /  six monthly 
intervals. The reseller must always give advance notice 
of new prices to consumers, who can then rescind their 
contract.
With the fall in spot prices of gas, a number of regula-
tors  /  authorities have been concerned about that reduc-
tion being passed on to consumers, the possible outcome 
being asymmetric retail price patterns  ; ex post analyses 57
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have been conducted in a number of countries, including 
Germany and the United Kingdom.
This monitoring is only possible and effective if the regula-
tors (or others) have the power to pursue it and to take 
ad hoc measures (development seen in Germany since 
2008 under the aegis of the competition authorities).
Even in countries where prices are not regulated, the 
authorities keep a watchful eye on prices of electricity and 
gas because these are essential household expenditure 
subject to a public service obligation, with prices which 
must be determined by the market. Regulators, competi-
tion authorities and consumer protection bodies intervene 
to varying degrees in accordance with their respective 
area of competence.
In September 2009, the Citizens’ Energy Forum (or 
London Forum)  (1) which is the European platform for con-
sultation between market players (regulators, operators, 
consumers) on the retail energy markets stated in the 
conclusions of its second meeting that it was in favour of 
close cooperation and coordination between regulators, 
competition authorities and organisations representing 
consumers in regard to supervision of the market and 
action against anti-competitive or unfair practices (EC, 
2009b).
3.3  Towards more visible methods of gas pricing in 
Belgium
Although in Belgium, as elsewhere, gas and electricity 
prices have contributed to inflation and increased its 
volatility, they are also largely responsible for the diver-
gence between Belgian prices and the European average 
(Cornille, 2009). Similarly, it emerges from econometric 
studies that, in comparison with neighbouring countries, 
the methods of setting gas prices in Belgium are a factor 
in the variability of consumer prices of gas, and the 
greater speed with which those prices adapt to changes in 
gas import prices (Baugnet and Dury, 2010). Essentially, in 
economic terms, price changes are appropriate incentives 
for supply and demand adjustments, provided they reflect 
the real movement in supplier costs. For comparison, retail 
prices of natural gas are more volatile in Belgium than in 
other countries, with undesirable second-round effects in 
terms of the general trend in prices, effects which could 
be countered by measures capable of smoothing that 
volatility. However, any intervention by the authorities in 
the methods of setting retail prices must take place in a 
context in which Belgium already has totally deregulated 
prices according to the ERGEG definition  : introduc-
ing maximum prices, for example, would be a form of 
regulation. Moreover, any intervention in the frequency 
of indexation must be preceded by an assessment of the 
advantages of reduced price volatility in relation to the 
risk that operators pass on to the consumer the costs 
of price risk hedging which less frequent adjustment of 
their selling prices would imply, plus any menu costs. It 
would be appropriate, at least, to consider practices in 
other countries where prices are deregulated. Two types 
of adjustment are conceivable.
First, introduction of “supervised” freedom to set prices 
with effective prior verification that the price adjustments 
proposed by the suppliers are indeed cost reflective. That 
approach is based on the one adopted in the Netherlands, 
where the validity for changes to both electricity and gas 
prices is examined by the regulator before they take effect 
(Coppens, 2010). That presupposes, in particular, the 
creation of an obligation to submit the changes and their 
justification in advance, and confidential access to infor-
mation relating to the management of the gas purchase 
portfolio (bilateral contracts, acquisitions on exchanges 
or at auctions). A complete and accurate assessment of 
these purchase conditions is also important for suppliers 
facing competition on the wholesale markets. Generally 
speaking, the required transparency is more complex to 
implement than in the past owing to the involvement 
of multiple operators for whom the relevant market is 
not – or is no longer – confined to the national market. 
Another option is ex post supervision, like that applied 
in Germany following the amendment to the legislation 
against restraints of competition, adopted at the end of 
2007. The competition authorities can investigate (and 
prosecute) a dominant firm for overcharging on the basis 
that other companies’ prices are lower or that the price is 
disproportionate to the costs, but without having to prove 
that the company in question is guilty of anti-competitive 
behaviour. The obligation to explain the differences found 
rests on the company in question (Lohmann, 2009).
Also, information on prices needs to be easier for the 
average consumer to understand. Unless they repeat all 
the calculations or print the price lists every month, con-
sumers do not get any information on the prices which 
they actually pay month by month  (2). It must be said that 
this comparison of the tariffs offered by the operators has 
shown that the picture is rather unclear for consumers, 
as the information given out allows them to get only a 
rough idea of the price paid, and especially of how it has 
(1)  The Commission’s Third Energy Package includes improvements to the opera-
tion of the retail markets for the benefit of consumers. In that connection, the 
Commission created this special regulatory platform on the basis of experiences 
gained from the Madrid Forum (gas) and the Florence Forum (electricity).
(2)  The federal regulator provides these figures in its monthly analysis of “Natural gas 
prices on the residential market”, but without any link to the calculation of the 
invoiced price.58
changed. In fact, the only price which consumers see on 
the invoice is an average price calculated over the invoic-
ing period. Under the sectoral agreement in favour of 
“consumers on the liberalised electricity and gas market”, 
consumers can obtain free of charge the detailed calcula-
tions of the components of their invoices (including the 
price components and details of the indexation mecha-
nisms). One possibility would be to present the movement 
in the monthly prices charged alongside the movement 
in the standard consumption profile used for weighting 
the monthly prices in establishing the price charged for 
the energy. That approach is illustrated in chart 12 for the 
three calendar years 2007 to 2009  (1). It helps gain a better 
understanding of the composition of the price invoiced.
Finally, increased cooperation and  /  or close coordina-
tion between the regulators, the competition authorities 
and the organisations representing consumers in the 
supervision of the markets would enhance transparency 
regarding these complex pricing mechanisms for the 
consumer.
4.  International price comparison, a 
tricky exercise
The differences revealed by international gas price com-
parisons may be due to the gas price itself and / or to the 
methods used to measure it.
This article has shown that retail price deregulation is 
a process which is still going on in some EU Member 
States, and that any price comparison is therefore biased 
to some extent. It should be noted that the level of retail 
gas price regulation is far form uniform between the 
various American States (see Annex 3 on liberalisation in 
the United States). The persistence of varying forms of 
regulation limits the operators’ scope for action and price 
adjustments, and that may also affect the level and volatil-
ity of the natural gas price indices.
Moreover, freedom to set prices implies the existence of 
multiple formulas in accordance with the general principle 
whereby resellers need to find the right balance between 
the terms on which they purchase the gas and the tariff 
formulas offered for sale on the retail market. The under-
lying parameters used may therefore vary and be adapted 
at different frequencies (monthly, quarterly, half-yearly, 
ad hoc or even annually with the fixed-price contracts), 
while respecting the regulatory framework set by the 
national authorities. In neighbouring countries, indexa-
tion takes place less frequently or on an ad hoc basis with 
prior announcement of the new indexed prices. The cost 
associated with these procedures (obligation to notify 
customers) tends to discourage frequent indexation. 
Conversely, automatic indexation such as that applied in 
Belgium avoids some of those costs and is all the more 
attractive since all operators adopt that approach in their 
variable-price contracts. This rather specific situation also 
helps to explain why the consumer price of gas changes 
faster in line with changes in gas import prices in Belgium, 
compared to neighbouring countries (Baugnet and Dury, 
2010).
Finally, the statistical recording of price movements may 
also lead to differences. In its annual report on the 2009 
price analysis (NAI Price Observatory, 2010), the National 
Accounts Institute mentions a number of differences 
between Belgium’s neighbouring countries in the meth-
odology used to record gas and electricity prices :
–   in the composition of the sample of prices monitored. 
In Belgium and the Netherlands, the national index is 
(1)  The gas consumption generally recorded at annual intervals is allocated over time 
on the basis of a standard consumption profile obtained either from a Synthetic 
Load Profile (SLP), or from the number of degree-days, both being available on 
the Synergrid website. The profile presented here corresponds exactly to calendar 
years. In practice, this type of chart is specific to each invoicing procedure, since 
the weighting is influenced by the number of days between the issue of two suc-
cessive invoices and the corresponding SLP / degree days. Thus, the weightings in 
chart 12 relate to calendar years (invoice on 31 December in each year) and vary 
from one year to the next.
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calculated on the basis of prices charged by suppliers 
active on the market, weighted according to their 
market share. Germany conducts a sample survey in 
188 towns on the basis of the best prices offered by the 
leading operator. In France, it is only regulated prices 
that are taken into account ;
–   in the frequency of the surveys, the calculation of 
averages or the use of end-of-period data, the definition 
of consumption profiles and the recording times.
In Belgium, the change in the method of HICP recording 
with effect from 2007, switching from a “payments” 
approach (based on annual invoices) to an “acquisition” 
approach (based on the monthly prices recorded at the 
time of acquisition of the product) corresponds to an 
alignment with the methods of recording monitored prices 
in other countries (Cornille, 2009). However, the actual 
monitoring of the monthly prices actually paid is subject 
to an initial delay of one to two months between the price 
published in the price lists and the monthly price used 
for invoicing, a delay resulting from the non-availability 
of the parameters at the time when the operators com-
municate those data to the regional regulators. A second 
one-month delay in the transmission of data from the 
Walloon and Flemish regulators to the Directorate General 
of Statistics and Economic Information is reflected in the 
calculation of the HICP (NAI Price Observatory, 2010). 
Whereas in neighbouring countries the HICP reflects the 
price charged for the corresponding consumption month, 
in Belgium it reflects figures which are two months out 
of step with the prices which will actually be invoiced  (1).   
That delay is evident in chart 13, showing year-on-year 
changes in the “0.0468 GOL + 0.25 HUB” component 
used by many operators in their indexation formulas, and 
the corresponding movements in the HICP for natural gas 
(HICP-gas). These two curves display a very similar pattern, 
and the similarity is even more marked in the timing of the 
changes if the figures for the HICP two months ahead 
are considered (HICP-gas (m–2)) in order to compensate 
for the delay in communicating the data. However, the 
similarity between the GOL+HUB component and the 
HICP-gas is not perfect in regard to the range of the 
fluctuations, as the latter reflects an average price and is 
therefore influenced by price changes other than those 
linked to the parameters GOL and HUB (introduction of 
fixed-price contracts, use of the parameters HFO, TTF and 
DAH, increase in the proportion of stable components, 
inclusion of distribution costs and suppliers’ margins in 
the HICP-gas, etc.)  (2).
Conclusions
As commercial intermediaries, gas resellers pass on the 
cost of buying the gas plus a margin, so that the move-
ment in purchase costs is generally reflected in the selling 
price.
This article has adopted the approach of analysing in 
more depth the mechanisms governing pricing on the 
retail market on the basis of the price lists of the opera-
tors active on the Belgian market. It turns out that the 
method which the various operators use to set the retail 
price is very similar in its principles, and is based on 
indexation of the selling price to parameters which reflect 
the movement in the cost of buying the gas, thereby 
passing on the price risk to the consumer. That indexa-
tion is based on formulas specific to each operator and 
applied at monthly intervals, which is a very convenient 
situation for all the operators since a major part of the 
price risk is automatically transferred to the consumer 
without entailing any additional information costs. On 
the other hand, it leads to monthly price adjustments and 
short-term volatility. Adjustments to the tariff formulas 
themselves, left to the discretion of the operators, do not 
stand out very clearly. Their justification in view of the 
real movement in the costs incurred in purchasing gas on 
the wholesale market remains an issue, as the relevant 
data are not published. On that point, verification by the 
competent institutions regarding the representativeness 
of the indices used in terms of the movement in costs 
(1)  This means that changes in the price of gasoil affect the consumer price of gas 
after a lag of seven to eight months (NAI Price Observatory, 2009).
(2)  The same applies to the movement in the HICP for electricity (Coppens, 2010).
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and the justification for successive adjustments merits 
support.
The disclosure of the automatic indexation mechanisms 
has the advantage of being relatively simple and trans-
parent (certainly after in-depth analysis) in regard to 
fundamental movements in the parameters and their 
influence on prices. However, for the average consumer, 
the calculation of indexed prices appears complex and 
the information supplied seems incomplete, as it is not 
easy for consumers to find out about movements in the 
monthly price, even if only to understand the price on 
the invoice. Consumers wishing to hedge against the 
price risk can always eliminate the uncertainty associ-
ated with variable-price contracts by signing a fixed-price 
contract, but they have to do so on their old contract 
renewal date, giving due notice if they want to avoid any 
additional charges.
The use in Belgium of automatic indexation with publica-
tion of the underlying formula applied differs from the 
practices prevailing in neighbouring countries. Except for 
Denmark (though maximum prices do apply there), none 
of the countries analysed had any systematic indexation 
mechanism like that adopted by all the suppliers active 
in Belgium. In those countries, prices are adjusted less 
frequently or on an ad hoc basis, always with prior noti-
fication of the consumers. That limits the frequency of 
adjustments in view of the costs associated with those 
procedures, hence attenuating gas price volatility.
Moreover, the freedom to set prices enjoyed by opera-
tors in Belgium has led to discretionary adjustments to 
indexation involving an increase in the stable portion of 
the price unconnected with movements in the energy 
parameters.
For the purpose of international comparison, this finding 
has to be viewed in the European context in which varying 
situations coexist and distort the movement in gas prices. 
The European gas market is in fact undergoing a process 
of liberalisation, with the actual arrangements and agen-
das varying between Member States. Depending on the 
country, there may be regulated prices, price approval 
procedures, maximum prices or totally unregulated prices. 
However, these prices are still at least subject to supervi-
sion owing to the authorities’ concern that the retail 
prices charged should reflect the true cost of a product 
which is subject to a public service obligation, which is an 
item of essential household expenditure, and for which 
the price must be determined by the market.
The scope for creating effective competition on the retail 
market remains also dependent on the competition 
conditions prevailing on the wholesale market and the 
associated issues, which are often international in scale. 
They concern in particular the eventual emergence of a 
European oligopoly on the wholesale market, the devel-
opment of LNG transactions and their impact on sup-
plies, the breaking or continuation of the structural link 
between gas prices and oil prices, etc.61
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Annex 1 : Main price adjustments made since liberalisation
Transition from regulated indexation to indexation at the discretion of the suppliers
Before the full liberalisation of the market on 1 January 2007, the indexations used were based on the gas acquisition 
index (IGA) reflecting the movement in the natural gas price paid to public distributors. Before that date, this index 
was based on the G parameter, the “all gas” border price, the weighted average of gas import prices (in €  /  MWh) at 
the Belgian border  (1) for supplies to the Belgian market in the long term, including all fixed and proportional charges 
associated with these regular imports : G = P + F
with
F =   fixed costs associated with the gas supply to the market, such as costs of shipping and regasification of Algerian gas, 
costs of transporting North Sea gas to the Netherlands, and the Zeebrugge terminal charges.
The G parameter was calculated by the CREG up to December 2006, and was then replaced by a new reference 
parameter, the “New G”, as the historical operator stopped notifying the old G parameter following the full liberalisation 
of the gas market in Belgium on 1 January 2007. The “New G” was very similar to the old G parameter in its value and 
movement, and referred to the price of Brent crude, GOL gasoil, and HFO extra heavy fuel oil, and to the consumer 
price index, the CPI.
New G = 1 / 3 (0.300 Brent) + 1 / 3 (0.069 GOL) + 1 / 3 (0.072 HFO) + 1.16130 {(CPIn–1 / CPIn–2) – 0.02}.
Publication of the IGA ceased in November 2007, and all suppliers now use their own indexation formulas. The IGA 
values were used in chart 4 and extrapolated, in part, beyond November 2007 on the basis of data supplied by the 
Institut de conseil et d’études en développement durable (ICEDD, 2009a).
With the full liberalisation of the Belgian market, all suppliers are free to define their own tariff formulas for energy 
costs. The indexation adopted by the suppliers has retained the indexation formula used in the days of regulation, with :
annual standing charge = (a x IGD)
energy cost (proportional charges) = (b x Igm) + (c x IGD)
where a, b and c are tariff coefficients specific to each supplier, each tariff formula and each consumption class ;
IGD = the gas distribution index, published by the CREG and reflecting the movement in distribution costs other than 
those relating to gas purchases ;
Igm or GPI = an index reflecting the movement in the cost of purchasing natural gas and calculated by each supplier 
instead of the old gas acquisition index (IGA). Initially, these indexation formulas were very similar for all suppliers, being 
of the type : (0.25 HUB + 0.0468 GOL603 + x * (CPIy–1 / CPIy–2) + constant) / 21.21479
The successive tariff adjustments are detailed below for each supplier. They concern the annual consumption class ranging 
between 5,001 and 30,000 kWh / yr, which corresponds to the use of gas for cooking and heating. The movement in the 
proportional charge covering the energy cost is indicated in the chart by a thick blue line, while the thinner lines show 
the prices which would have applied if the tariff formulas adopted successively had been retained. The period in which 
the tariff shown applies is specified in the key to each line which then coincides with the thick blue line.
P = PNL 
ACQNL + PNor1 
ACQNor1 + PNor2 
ACQNor2 + PAlg 
ACQAlg
ACQTOT ACQTOT ACQTOT ACQTOT
(1)  Average purchase price weighted by volumes of gas bought by Distrigas from its suppliers : Gasunie, North Sea I, North Sea II and Sonatrach (CREG, 2006).62
Electrabel Customer Solutions
In October 2007, ECS modified its indexation formula by increasing the value of the constant (this amounted to 
attenuating the reduction effect of the ECS constant, which is negative – see section 2.1.2.2). In February 2010, the 
value of the coefficient applicable to the CPI was reduced from 4.83 to 4.63, leading to a cut of 0.02 cent  /  kWh, the 
supplier thus passing on part of the 35 % decline in the transmission charges included in the energy price (CREG, 2010b). 
The 2 % reduction applicable to the EnergyPlus deal was also passed on in the unit price.
chArt 14  movement in the price oF energy 

















2007 2008 2009 2010
GP I1 01/ 2007-09 / 2007 extrapolated
GP I2 10 / 2007-12 / 2009 extrapolated
GP I 2' 01/ 2010 - ... extrapolated
ECS published tariff63
implicAtions of liBErAlisAtion for mEthods  
of sEtting rEtAil gAs pricEs in BElgium
SPE-Luminus
The SPE-Luminus tariff formula (proportional component of the energy price) was adjusted in December 2007, 
October 2008 and March  /  April 2010. The changes concerned the coefficient applied to the IGD (energy cost 
= ((b x Igm) + (c x IGD)) which was increased in December 2007 (from 0.3 to 0.47 = +8  %) and October 2008   
(from 0.47 to 0.6 = +4  %). The constant changed from –3 to –3.2 (–1  %) in March 2010 (and to –3.23 in April 2010)   
with retroactive effect from January 2010, giving customers the benefit of the change in transmission charges.
In the second quarter of 2008, SPE-Luminus introduced another variable-price contract (Luminus Connect) using 
a new Igc index based partly on the spot price of gas as well as the HUB and the GOL with a reduced weighting   
(50  % x [0.0468 GOL603 + 0.25 HUB + 0.995999 DAH] – 1.53897). The DAH is based on forward prices at the 
Zeebrugge Hub Day ahead market, the weighted monthly value being calculated with the aid of the SLP consumption 
profile. Only the aggregated Igc is published.
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Nuon
In November 2007, Nuon adopted the same formula as ECS (Gni index based on the parameters HUB, GOL, CPI + 
constant), abandoning its Ign index based solely on petroleum products (GOL, Brent and HFO). In January 2010, a new 
parameter Gni2 was defined with reintroduction of the reference to the price of heavy fuel oil HFO (parameters HUB, GOL 
and HFO). The reference to the CPI was abandoned and replaced by a higher constant. Also, the weighting applied to the 
IGD was halved. The weighting coefficients applied to the IGD were revised in March and in April 2010, as the weight 
of the IGD tends to disappear. With effect from September 2010 an intermediate consumption class was introduced in 
regard to tariffs for consumers using gas for cooking and heating : the class ranging from 5,001 to 30,000 kWh / yr was 
extended and divided into sub-classes 5,001 to 20,000 kWh / yr and 20,001 to 40,000 kWh / yr. The IGD coefficient was 
slightly reduced for the higher band. In October 2010, the IGD coefficient was increased substantially (multiplied by 200) 
and a negative value completed the indexation formula, which had the effect of neutralising the constant incorporated 
in the Gni2 index. In the end, that amounted to replacing the constant with the IGD without modifying the definition 
of the Gni2 index.
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Lampiris
The Lampiris tariff formula was modified in January 2009 and since then its only energy reference parameter has   
been the TTF, an index in €  /  MWh of forward natural gas contracts in the Netherlands for delivery in baseload the 
following month (published by Heren ICIS). The old index (0.25 HUB + 0.0468 GOL – 3.068 + 3.2 IGD) was replaced by 
(TTF + 5.1 IGD). In February 2009, the change in the indexation represented a cut of 10 % in relation to the old tariff, 
and remained of the same order of magnitude throughout 2009, although it reached 20 % (04 / 2009 and 05 / 2010) as 
a result of the respective movements in prices of oil and of gas on the spot gas markets.
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In January 2007, Essent adopted an indexation system based on the HUB and GOL, without reference to the CPI 
but applying a slightly positive constant. The adjustment of its tariff formula in January 2008 consisted in increasing 
that constant (from +0.143 to +3.17) and the IGD weighting (from 0.092 to 0.1), resulting in a 10  % increase in the 
proportional charge. The annual standing charge was also increased from 22.82 IGD to 25.41 IGD, representing an   
11  % increase in the annual standing charge due per access point. The latest tariff revision entered into force in 
April 2010 ; in that instance, the constant went up again (from +3.17 to +6.16) and the HFO parameter was introduced 
(with weightings shared between GOL and HFO), which amounted to a price increase excluding VAT of around 6 %.
Since October 2010, Essent has offered another variable-price contract, Essent Eco, in which the indexation moves   
in line with that applied by Lampiris according to the formula (0.1 TTF1.0.1 + 0.507 IGD) for the consumption class from 
0 to 30,000 kWh / yr (the only difference being that the TTF1.0.1 is published by the Endex exchange).
chArt 18  movement in the price oF energy 

















2007 2008 2009 2010
01/ 2007-12/ 2007 extrapolated
01/  2008 - 03 / 2010 extrapolated
04 / 2010 - ... extrapolated
Essent published tariff67
implicAtions of liBErAlisAtion for mEthods  
of sEtting rEtAil gAs pricEs in BElgium
Annex 2 :   ERGEG – situation regarding end-user price regulation as  
of 1 January 2010
Table 2 is taken from a publication issued by the European Regulators’ Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) setting out 
the results of their latest survey of the actual liberalisation of gas and electricity end-user prices. It presents an overview 
of market opening and price regulation in the national gas market segments open to competition within the EU.
The ERGEG reported a number of findings :
–   in fifteen of the twenty-five countries analysed in the ERGEG study, regulated retail prices exist alongside market 
prices in at least one of the gas market segments (households, small businesses, medium-sized to large businesses 
and energy-intensive industries) ;
–   the higher the level of consumption in a segment, the less likely it is that the segment will be subject to regulated 
prices  : regulated prices still apply in fifteen countries in the case of the household segment, in eleven countries 
for small businesses, eight countries for medium-sized to large businesses, and six countries for energy-intensive 
industries ;
–   in most of the countries with regulated prices, over 80 % of customers are eligible for supply at those prices, in each 
market segment, which indicates a lack of competition in the retail market. However, that percentage is often lower 
for the segments where consumption is heavier ;
–   it is not possible to draw any firm conclusions about the relative level of regulated and free market prices when the 
two coexist. The results for each consumption segment differ considerably from one country to another. In France, 
the regulated price is higher than the free market prices offered to households, as suppliers offer discounts on the 
regulated price. In Spain, the regulated price is similar to the market price. In Lithuania, the regulated price is lower 
than the liberalised prices. These diverse situations reflect the many varying motives justifying the maintenance of 
regulated prices (ERGEG, 2009) ;
–    in most countries with regulated prices, customers who have opted for liberalised prices can revert to regulated prices 
either when they like or after a certain period of time ;
–   in three-quarters of cases, it is the regulator that sets the regulated prices (otherwise it is the minister). In roughly a 
quarter of cases, the decision to remove regulated prices rests with the regulator (or otherwise with the minister, the 
government or parliament).68
Table  2  Situation regarding end-uSer price regulation aS of 1 January 2010
 
Country Final market 
opening date
Price regulation on 1 January 2010
Households Small  
businesses
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Sweden 2007-07
The United Kingdom 1998





XXXX-XX Scheduled date of price regulation removal
Changes between July 2008 and January 2010 :
End-user price regulation in open market segment removed
Segment closed in July 2008
Source : ERGEG – Status review of end-user price regulation as of 1 January 2010.
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Annex 3 : Liberalisation – regulation in the United States
As elsewhere, local distribution companies provide the local transmission and distribution services. Concerning the supply 
to the retail market (residential consumers and small-volume gas users), levels of liberalisation vary from one State to 
another according to the laws and regulations  : twenty-seven States are not considering unbundling programs in the 
residential gas sector ; the other twenty-one and the District of Columbia have adopted laws and regulations to that end, 
but have not all made the same amount of progress in the liberalisation process. Finally, only three States and the District 
of Columbia have a fully liberalised market, active and accessible to all consumers in the residential sector. Four other 
States have full market liberalisation, but the lack of active suppliers has hampered the development of a competitive 
market in their territory (fewer than 5 % of active customers despite 100 % eligibility). The large consumers of gas have 
been able to obtain supplies from the liberalised market for many years.
Sources : EIA / DOE (2010a), Status of natural gas residential choice programs by State as of December 2009 and EIA / DOE 
(2010b), Natural gas residential choice programs – US summary 2009.70
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